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Sleep-wake protocols are critical in sensor networks to ensure long-lived operation. However, an open problem 
is how to develop efficient mechanisms that can be incorporated with sleep-wake protocols to ensure both long-
lived operation and a high degree of security. Our contribution in this paper is to address this problem by using 
local monitoring, a powerful technique for detecting and mitigating control/data attacks in sensor networks. In 
local monitoring, a node oversee part of the traffic going in and out of its neighbors to determine if the behavior is 
suspicious, such as, delay in forwarding a packet. However, a direct application of local monitoring will interfere 
with sleep-wake protocols by having nodes stay awake for the purpose of monitoring. In this work, we present a 
protocol called SLAM to make local monitoring parsimonious in its energy consumption and integrate it with any 
extant sleep-wake protocol in the network. The challenge is to enable this in a secure manner and this is addressed 
in the face of nodes that may be adversarial and not wake up nodes responsible for monitoring its traffic. We 
prove analytically that security coverage is not weakened by the sleeping. We perform simulation experiments to 
demonstrate that the performance of local monitoring is practically unchanged while listening energy savings of 
30 to 129 times, depending on the network load, is achieved. 
1 Introduction 
Sensor networks are typically comprised of large numbers of sensor nodes placed in the environment to be 
monitored. These nodes cooperate among themselves for information gathering and analysis, and are becoming an 
important platform in several domains, including military warfare, civilian emergency operations, scientific 
explorations, and monitoring of climate and biological habitats. The open nature of the wireless communication 
channels, the lack of infrastructure, the fast deployment practices, and the hostile environments where they may 
be deployed, make them vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks. The attacks could involve eavesdropping, 
message tampering, or identity spoofing, all of which have been addressed by customized cryptographic 
primitives for sensor networks. Alternately, the attacks may be targeted to the control or the data traffic in sensor 
networks. Typical examples of control traffic are routing, monitoring the liveness of a node, topology discovery, 
and distributed location determination. Different kinds of control traffic attacks have been proposed in the 
literature, such as, the wormhole attack, the rushing attack, the Sybil attack, the sinkhole attack, and the HELLO 
flood attack. Control traffic attacks are especially destructive since they can be launched even without having 
access to any cryptographic keys or compromising any legitimate node in the network and they can be used to 
subvert the functionality of the network by disrupting data flow.  
To mitigate such attacks, many researchers have used the concept of cooperative local monitoring within a 
node’s neighborhood ( [30]- [37]). In neighborhood monitoring (or local monitoring), nodes oversee part of the 
traffic going in and out of their neighbors. Many protocols have been built on top of neighbor monitoring for 
intrusion detection (e.g.,  [29]  [30]), building trust and reputation among nodes (e.g.  [33]  [34]), protecting against 
control and data traffic attacks (e.g.  [35]- [38]) and in building secure routing protocols (e.g.  [31]  [32]  [36]). 
Specifically, in  [36] and  [37] the authors have presented a technique for detection of control and data attacks in 
ad-hoc networks using local monitoring. Control attacks are launched by delaying, dropping, modifying, or 
fabricating forwarded traffic and can be detected by a group of neighbors, called guard nodes, performing local 
monitoring. The guard nodes are normal nodes in the network and perform the basic operations of sensing, in 
addition to monitoring. The same attack primitives applied to data traffic can also be detected by local monitoring. 
However, local monitoring could come at a high cost for energy constrained senor networks, since it requires the 
guard nodes to be awake all the time to oversee network behavior. To the best of our knowledge, no one has 
studied sleeping protocols for optimizing the energy overhead of monitoring while maintaining the quality of the 
monitoring service. This is the problem we address in this paper. The main challenge lies in providing a secure 




In this paper we propose a set of mechanisms (SLAM) that adapt the existing local monitoring technique to 
significantly reduce the time a node needs to be awake for the purpose of monitoring. The proposed mechanism 
adapts itself depending on the kind of sleeping protocol used in the network, henceforth referred to as the baseline 
sleeping protocol (BSP). For networks that use synchronized sleeping algorithms (e.g.,  [4]  [18]- [22]), i.e., nodes 
wakeup and go to sleep in a synchronized manner, SLAM does not need to do anything. There exist several 
application-specific sleeping algorithms, for example, to maintain a given sensing coverage (each point should be 
sensed by at least k nodes) or a given network connectivity level (each pair of nodes should have k disjoint paths). 
For these protocols (e.g.,  [6]- [12]  [16]), SLAM can serve neighbor monitoring as well by modifying an input 
parameter to the existing sleeping algorithm. The exact modification depends on the BSP itself and we provide in 
the paper an example of adapting a coverage protocol. Finally, for those networks that have no existing BSP or 
have on-demand sleep-wake, i.e., nodes are woken up at arbitrary times determined by the communication, SLAM 
provides a generic on-demand sleeping algorithm, called On-Demand SLAM. This algorithm assumes that in 
addition to the normal antenna, each node has a passive or a low-power wake-up antenna. A node that is not 
involved in network activities, such as, data forwarding is ordinarily sleeping according to the BSP. However, for 
monitoring purposes, it is woken up on demand by a neighboring node using the wake-up antenna.  
On- demand SLAM has to account for the fact that wake-up antennas have a delay in waking up nodes on 
receiving the control signal. By a suitable design, we prevent the additional delay due to sleep-wake from 
becoming cumulative with the number of hops between the communicating pair of nodes. Instead, a pipelined 
effect is achieved and the additional delay becomes constant independent of the number of hops. We provide 
theoretical analysis for energy saving using On-Demand SLAM compared to a baseline monitoring protocol  [37]. 
We build a simulation model for SLAM using ns-2 and perform a comparative evaluation of local monitoring with 
and without SLAM. The results show that the performance of local monitoring in terms of false and missed alarms 
is very close in both cases while the overhead of SLAM in terms of listening energy is between 30 to 129 times 
lower, depending on the network traffic. The results show the effect of the number of malicious nodes, the traffic 
load, and the fraction of data being monitored on the overhead of local monitoring.  
We summarize our contributions in this paper as follows: 
1. We provide a technique for conserving energy while performing local monitoring without significantly 
degrading its security performance. This we believe is fundamental to deploying local monitoring in any 
energy conscious network.  
2. We propose a generic on-demand sleep-wake algorithm for network monitoring in scenarios where either no 
application-specific sleeping algorithm exists or the sleep-wake is based on arbitrary communication pattern. 
3. We analytically prove that SLAM does not add any vulnerability to the existing local monitoring technique. 
4. We conduct extensive simulation experiments on an existing local monitoring technique with and without 
SLAM and show a significant reduction in monitoring cost with negligible degradation in the monitoring 
quality of service.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 presents related work in the field of sleep-wake 
protocols. Section  3 describes SLAM. Section  4 presents mathematical analysis of the energy overhead and 
security of SLAM. Section  5 presents the simulation experiments and results.  Section  6 concludes the paper. 
2 Related Work 
Node sleeping is an important mechanism to prolong the life time of sensor networks. This topic has been 
discussed extensively in the literature and many protocols have been proposed for various types of applications 
such as object tracking  [1]- [2]. It has been realized that under current hardware designs, the maximum energy 
savings can be achieved through putting nodes to sleep—three orders of magnitude less current draw than in an 
idle node for the popular Mica mote platform for sensor nodes.  
Primarily three different mechanisms are used to put nodes to sleep. The first is called synchronized wakeup-
sleep scheduling in which the nodes in the network are put to sleep and woken up at the same time in a centralized 
(e.g.,  [21]  [22]) or a distributed manner (e.g.  [4]  [18]- [20]). A disadvantage of such protocols is that the duty cycle 
is application dependent and not known a priori. Most importantly, they require the network to have an accurate 
time synchronization service. Furthermore, in scenarios with rare event detection, no event happens and the nodes 




wastage of energy. The second mechanism is based on selecting a subset of nodes to be woken up to maintain 
some properties in the network, such as sensing coverage (e.g.,  [6]- [12]), network connectivity (e.g.,  [4]  [5]  [13]-
 [15]), or both coverage and connectivity (e.g.  [16]).  
The third mechanism is based on-demand sleep-wake protocols. These on-demand sleep-wake protocols use 
either special purpose low-power wake-up antennas (e.g.,  [23]- [26]) or passive wake-up antennas  [27]. These 
antennas are responsible for receiving an appropriate beacon from a neighbor node and waking up the node for its 
full operation. Thus, for environments where events of interest are relatively rare, the time for the low power 
operation with the wake-up antennas being on, dominates. Further details about the operation of the antennas are 
mentioned in Section  3.4 where SLAM uses these antennas for waking up guard nodes. 
Many sensor applications require security and reliability; therefore, researchers consider designing dependable 
sensor networks that behave reliably and securely. Neighbor monitoring is a well-known technique that is used for 
securing sensor network protocols. However, to the best of our knowledge none of the previous local monitoring 
protocols consider operating in a network where nodes may need to be put to sleep for energy conservation. 
Therefore, we are the first to address this issue.  
3 SLAM Protocol Description 
The primary goal of SLAM is to minimize the time a node has to be awake to perform local monitoring. Local 
monitoring is used to make sure that packets are not dropped, delayed, modified, or forged along the path from 
source to destination  [36]. SLAM adds one more task to the list of events that a guard node needs to monitor—
verifying whether the node being monitored wakes up the requisite guards or fails to do so due to malicious 
motivations. Depending on the BSP used in the network, SLAM has three different mechanisms for proposing 
sleeping for networks with local monitoring—The No-Action-Required SLAM protocol, the Adapted SLAM 
protocol, and the On-Demand SLAM protocol.  
3.1 System Model and Assumptions 
SLAM assumes that the network is static and the links are bi-directional. SLAM requires a pre-distribution pair-
wise key management protocol (e.g.  [40],  [41]) such that any two nodes can acquire a key for encryption and 
authentication. In On-Demand SLAM, each node is equipped with either a passive  [27] or a low-power wakeup 
antenna  [24]. Any two nodes that need to communicate, establish a route between them using an underlying 
routing protocol. We assume that the source node is honest. No assumption is made about the adversary nodes 
following the sleep-wake protocol, only the honest nodes follow it. Each node knows its first-hop neighbors and 
the neighbors of each neighbor, e.g., using a technique as in  [36]. Malicious behavior is manifested through 
delaying, dropping, fabricating, or modifying packets. The malicious behavior of fruitlessly sending a wake-up 
signal to a node is not addressed since this potential exists in any on-demand wake-up protocol and SLAM neither 
exacerbates nor solves this problem. 
3.2 The No-Action-Required SLAM Protocol 
This scheme is used in a network that has a sleeping algorithm which is completely compatible with local 
monitoring. Such sleep algorithms fall in a class of protocols in which the network (or the communicating parts of 
the network) is synchronized in its sleep-wake schedule and all the nodes wake up and go to sleep in distributed 
or centralized synchrony. Examples of such protocols include Span  [4], S-MAC  [19], habitat monitoring  [22], and 
those used in applications of sensor networks in  [18] [20] [21]. In this BSP, the guards for the communication 
would also be woken up since, by definition, the guards are one-hop neighbors of the two nodes that form the link 
on which the communication is taking place. Thus, for this class of protocols, no modification is necessary to 
support sleeping and waking up of guards for local monitoring purposes.  Local monitoring in such scenarios does 
not incur any additional overhead on the network aside from the computational overhead.  
3.3 The Adapted SLAM Protocol 
This scheme is used for the class comprising coverage and/or connectivity preserving sleep-wake protocols. 
Examples of such kinds of sleeping algorithms are  [6]- [12] [16]. However, since these algorithms may be 
application-specific, each one of them may need to be adapted differently to support sleeping of guards as well. 




Consider for example the class of protocols that seeks to preserve Ks-coverage or Kc-connectivity in a network 
and puts nodes off to sleep without violating these properties. The property of Ks-coverage (s for sensing) denotes 
that every point in the field is sensed by at least Ks nodes. The property of Kc-connectivity (c for coverage) 
denotes that for critical communication, such as, between a node and the base station, at least Kc routes exist. The 
fundamental technique for adapting such sleeping algorithms to support sleeping of guards is to modify the value 
of Ks or Kc and invoke the original BSP.  
Consider a protocol that preserves coverage at Ks 
( [6]- [12]). Assume that the sensing range is Rs, the 
communication range is Rc, the detection 
confidence is g. In local monitoring, γ is defined as 
the minimum number of neighbors of a node, X, to 
convince another neighbor of X, say Y, that X is 
malicious if Y does not directly detect X as 
malicious  [37]. Assume the requisite number of 
guards needed for detection with sufficiently low 










Figure 1: Relationship between communication and 
sensing ranges
We shall try to find a relationship between Ks, Rs, Rc, and g with the help of Figure 1. What is the value of Ks to 
guarantee the number of guards is Γ? Let the density of the nodes in the network be ρ and the density of awake 
(or alive) nodes be ρl = Ks/πRs2. Let the common communication area between X and Y be Ac. Assume uniform 
distribution of the awake nodes.  
The number of nodes that are awake in Ac (Nw) is given by  
 2
s
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Therefore, the required value of Ks to get Γ guards is given by, 




π πΓ= ⋅ = ⋅  [2] 
The common communication area Ac for two nodes separated by a distance x is given by  
                                                       2 1 2 22 cos ( / 2 ) / 4c c c cA R x R x R x
−= − −  [3] 
The minimum value of this is achieved when x = Rc and the value is given by Ac,min = 1.23Rc2. Thus, the protocol 
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 [4] 
This will guarantee that the requisite number of guard nodes is awake to provide detection through local 
monitoring. Thus, Adapted SLAM invokes the BSP with the increased value of the parameter Ks. 
3.4 The On-Demand SLAM Protocol 
This protocol is used in a network that either has no BSP in operation or employs on-demand sleep-wake 
protocols. Therefore, we build a new sleep-wake protocol, called On-Demand SLAM that enables the guards to go 
sleep when not required for monitoring. The high level approach we take is on-demand sleep-wake of the guards 
rather than scheduling the sleep-wake periods. The defining characteristic of on-demand sleep-wake protocols is 
that any node in the network may, at random, initiate communication with any other node in the network. A sleep-
wake protocol does not impose any fixed communication pattern in the network. On-Demand SLAM uses either 
low-power wake-up antennas (e.g.,  [23]- [26]) or passive antennas with circuitry that can harvest signal energy to 
trigger a node to wake up  [27], as has been described in Section  2 (“Related Work”).  These kinds of antennas are 
commercially available (e.g.  [26]) as well as in research labs (e.g.,  [27]). For example Austriamicrosystems 
provides a low-power wake-up receiver (AS3931) with data rate of 2.731 KB/s and current consumption in 
standby mode of 6.6uA  [26]. Data transmission and reception require good channel quality, high speed, and thus 




information whether a packet targeted at this node is coming. In the rest of the paper, for ease of exposition we 
use the term “low-power wake-up radio” to mean either the low-power wake-up hardware or the passive wake-up 
hardware which consumes no power at all. 
In On-Demand SLAM, the low-power wake-up radio remains awake all the time while the normal radio is put to 
sleep when it is not sending or receiving data or is not required for monitoring. If a node is to send a packet out, it 
simply wakes up by itself; if a neighbor node is to send a packet to this node, the sender will send a short wake-up 
beacon using the wake-up radio channel, and on receiving this beacon the wake-up radio triggers the normal radio 
to be ready for the reception. The main disadvantage of the mechanism is that it still consumes extra energy. Even 
though the power consumed is small compared to the normal antenna (1uW compared to 10mW in  [23]), the 
energy is non-negligible due to long time of operation.  
Hence this mechanism has been modified to use passive wake-up antennas, known as radio-triggered power 
management mechanisms  [27]. In this mechanism a special hardware component – a radio-triggered circuit – is 
connected to one of the interrupt inputs of the processor. The circuit itself does not draw any current and is thus 
passive. The node can enter sleep mode without periodic wake-up. The wake-up mode is the usual working mode 
with all the functional units ready to work, and the average wake-up mode current is 20mA  [27]. In sleep mode, a 
node shuts down all its components except the memory, interrupt handler, and the timer and the sleep mode 
current is 100uA  [27]. When a network node changes from sleep mode to wake-up mode, there is a surge current 
of 30mA for a maximum of 5ms  [27]. When a power management message is sent by another node within a 
certain distance, the radio-triggered circuit collects enough energy to trigger the interrupt to wake up the node. 
Except for activating the wake-up interrupt, the radio-triggered circuit is independent of any other components on 
the node. If supported by hardware, the wake-up packet is sent at a special radio frequency. Other types of radio 
communication, at a different radio frequency, do not wake up the nodes even if the nodes are within the radio 
communication range. Note that hardware cost for adding multiple-frequency support is usually fairly low. Many 
recent low-end radio transceivers support multiple frequency operations  [28].  
The basic idea in designing On-Demand SLAM is for a node to wake up the requisite guard nodes to perform 
local monitoring on the communication it is going to send or forward on its outgoing link. The challenge in the 
design comes from the fact that any of the nodes (except the source) may be malicious and therefore may not 
faithfully wake up the guards. Local monitoring  [36]  [37] is used to mitigate malicious activities manifested 
through dropping, delaying, modifying, or forging of packets along the path from source to destination. In local 
monitoring, the sensor node is called a guard when performing traffic overhearing and monitoring of neighbors. 
The guards of a node A over the incoming packets from a transmitter X are the common neighbors of X and A.
In Figure 2, α1 and β1 are the guards of H1 over the 
link S H1. Information for each packet sent from X to 
A is saved in a watch buffer at each guard for a time Tw. 
The information maintained depends on the particular 
attack primitive to be detected (i.e., drop, delay, 
modify, or forge). A malicious counter (MalC(i,j)) is 
maintained at each guard node, i, for every  node, j, 
which i is monitoring. MalC(i,j) is incremented for any 
suspect malicious activity of j that is detected by i. 






Figure 2: n-hop route between S and D, neighbors 
of S, and guards of H1 and H2 
To account for intermittent natural failures that can occur at legitimate nodes, a node is determined to be 
misbehaving, only if the MalC goes above a threshold. When MalC(i,j) crosses the threshold, node i isolates node 
j refraining from sending or receiving any packet from node j. Node j is said to be isolated from the network when 
all its neighbors isolate it. We use the scenario depicted in Figure 2 to explain On-Demand SLAM. A source node 
S is sending data to a destination node D through an n-hop route S H1 H2 … Hn-1 D. In a network where 
all the nodes are honest, S will wake up the next hop H1 and the guard nodes (α1 and β1) before sending the packet 
to H1. In turn H1 will wake up H2 and guard nodes α2 and β2 before sending the packet on the next hop and so on, 
till the packet reaches D. Formally, according to  [37], the responsibility of a guard node α of Hi+1 over a link 
Hi→Hi+1 is to verify that: 




2. Hi+1 does not modify the packet it is forwarding 
3. Hi+1 only forwards a packet if a packet is sent on the Hi→Hi+1 link 
SLAM introduces a fourth responsibility. 
4. Hi+1 should wake up the guards for the communication on the Hi+1→Hi+2 link before forwarding the 
packet on that link 
If a rule  1- 3 is violated then the MalC value is incremented by appropriate amount; if rule  4 is violated, the 
MalC value increment is the maximum of the other MalC values because this rule violation may be used to mask 
violations of any of the rules  1- 3. 
In general for any multi-hop route connecting a source node S to a destination node D, S is responsible for 
waking up the correct guards for H1, and Hi is responsible for waking up the correct guards of Hi+1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n-2). 
The correct guards for H1 are guaranteed to be woken up by the assumption of honest source S and whether Hi 
honestly wakes up the next hop guards is monitored by the guards of Hi according to rule  4 above. 
In the following we present two variations of On-Demand SLAM depending on the wake-up mechanism a node 
follows to wake up the guards of next-hop. 
3.4.1 Guards-Only On-Demand SLAM (G-SLAM) 
The high level design goal in G-SLAM is to minimize the energy wasted in waking up nodes that can not serve 
as guards. On average half of the nodes within a single transmission range are not guards over a certain link 
(according to Equation I in  [37]). In Figure 2, α1 and β1 are valid guards of H1 over the link from S to H1, while Z 
and W are not. Also, note that the energy spent in warm up (transition between sleep mode and wakeup mode) is 
relatively high (almost 3 times as much as the energy spent in listening for the antennas described in  [27]). 
Therefore, waking up the appropriate nodes saves considerable amount of energy.  
For a guard node to verify honest wake-up, G-SLAM requires each node in the network to know, in addition to 
the identities of its first-hop and second-hop neighbors that are required by local monitoring, the location of each 
node within twice of its transmission range.  In Figure 2, a guard of H1, say α1, knows the location of its neighbor 
H1 and the location of all the neighbors of H1, S, β1, β2, α2, and H2. Using this information, α1 knows the common 
neighbors of H1 and H2, α2 and β2, which can act as the guards of H2 over the link H1 H2. Therefore, α1 can not 
be deceived by H1 waking up its neighbors that can not be guards for H2 (S and β1).  A disadvantage of G-SLAM is 
that it requires sophisticated wakeup hardware for a node to wake up a subset of nodes within the communication 
range using an id-attached beacon  [27].  
We explain G-SLAM algorithm with the help of Figure 2. Assume that node S has some data to be sent for the 
destination D over the route S H1 H2 … Hn-1 D connecting S to D. G-SLAM uses the following steps to 
wake up the correct guards along the route from S to D: 
1. Node S sends a signal to wake up the first-hop node (H1) and the guards for H1 (a1, b1). This signal could be 
either unicast to each of H1, α1, and β1 or a multicast signal that contains the identities of H1, α1, and β1. This 
signal is guaranteed to wake up the correct guards of H1 due to the assumption of honest source S. 
2. Node S sends the packets it has to H1 following the timing schedules presented in Section  3.4.3.  
3. Nodes H1, a1, and b1 after being woken up continue to remain awake for Tw. Tw is a parameter of local 
monitoring that captures the maximum time by which an entry in the watch buffer is evicted (beyond that is 
evidence of malicious action)  [37]. Each time a new packet is sent from S to H1, Tw is reinitialized. After Tw 
expires at a node, it goes back to sleep. 
4. Node H1, after being woken up, uses the timing schedule in Section  3.4.3 to schedule a wake-up signal for H2 
and the guards of H2 over the link H1→H2 (a2,b2). The guards of H1 over the link S→H1 are responsible for 
verifying that H1 fulfills this requirement.  




3.4.2 All-Neighbors On-Demand SLAM (A-SLAM) 
The high level design goal of A-SLAM is to relax the assumption that every node knows the location of its first-
hop and second-hop neighbors, and to simplify the wakeup signal and the wakeup hardware.  Consider a node S 
that has some data to send for the destination D over the route S H1 H2 … Hn-1 D, Figure 2. A-SLAM uses 
the following steps to wakeup the guards along the route from S to D: 
1. Node S broadcasts a wake-up signal to all its first-hop neighbors (Z,W,H1,a1,b1). The wake-up signal includes 
the identity of both the current sender (S) and the next-hop (H1). 
2. Each neighbor of S, after being woken up, decides whether to stay awake or go back to sleep based on the 
role that it may play on the ongoing communication. If that neighbor is the next-hop (H1), it stays a wake to 
forward the data and to monitor the next-hop from it (H2). If that neighbor is a guard (α1,β1) for the next-hop 
(H1), it stays awake to monitor the behavior of H1. Finally, if that neighbor is neither a guard for H1 nor a 
next-hop, it goes back to sleep immediately. 
3. Node S sends the data packet it has to H1 following the timing schedules presented in Section  3.4.3.  
4. Nodes H1, a1, and b1 after being woken up continue to do so for Tw. Each time a new packet is sent from S to 
H1, Tw is reinitialized. After Tw expires at a node, it goes back to sleep. 
5. H1 does the same steps that S did to wake up the next-hop (H2) and its guards (α2,β2). 
6. The process continues at each step to the destination. 
This scheme results in an increase in the energy consumption compared to G-SLAM due to the wake-up of the 
neighbors that are not guards.  
3.4.3 Timing of the Wakeup Signal 
In this section we generate the timing schedules for signaling the wake-up of nodes using On-Demand SLAM. 
This is important because the wake-up antennas have a warm-up period and this could increase the end-to-end 
delay of the communication. We design SLAM to send the wake-up signal at the earliest possibility so that the 
additional delay due to the sleep-wake protocol does not add up but is instead a constant independent of the 
number of hops.  
Let Tcontrol be the time to send the wake-up packet to the radio-triggered antenna, Twarmup be the time for a node 
to be fully awake and functional from the time it receives the wake-up packet (5 ms for Stankovic et al.’s antenna 
 [27]), and Tdata be the time to send a data packet which includes the forwarding time at intermediate nodes, 
therefore, within Tdata, an intermediate node completely receives a data packet and it can immediately start 
sending it. Moreover, let Tw be the maximum time a guard, after being woken up, waits for the packet to be 
forwarded. If the packet is not forwarded in this time, malicious action is suspected. Finally, let Twake be the time a 
node continues to be awake after being woken up.  
Let us consider an isolated (no other flows interfere with it) flow between S and D, separated by h hops. The 
intermediate nodes are n1, n2, …, nh-1.  Let gi represents the guards of node ni over the link ni-1 ni. Let vi 
represents the neighbors of ni that are not guards of ni+1 over the link ni ni+1. Consider the following two disjoint 
cases based on the relation between (Tcontrol + Twarmup) and Tdata. The analysis assumes a node is sleeping when it 
receives the wake-up signal. If not, the node just prolongs, if necessary, its wake-up time to meet the requirement 
imposed by the new wake-up signal. For example, assume a guard node G is currently awake till Current_time + δ 
due to some other activity (forward data, guard for another link, etc.). Assume that G receives at Current_time a 
wakeup signal that require G to stay awake till Current_time + Δ. Then, if δ  ≥  Δ, G does not need to do anything, 
otherwise G prolongs its wake-up time by Δ-δ and goes to sleep at Current_time + Δ instead of Current_time + δ. 
Case I: (Tcontrol + Twarmup) > Tdata with t = (Tcontrol + Twarmup) – Tdata 
Figure 3 shows the timing schedule for this case. Figure 3 (a) shows the timing schedule for a node in the route 
between the source and the destination. The node, n1, wakes up at T3 and goes to sleep at T8, where T8-T3 = Tdata 
(to receive data) + t (wait for the next-hop to be ready to receive the data) + Tdata (send the data to the next-hop) + 
{t + Tdata} (as a guard for n2) = 3Tdata+2t. Figure 3 (b) shows the timing schedule for a guard node. The guard, g1, 
wakes up at T3 and goes to sleep at T6, where T6-T3 = Tdata (to overhear incoming data to the node being 




the node being monitored, n1) = 2Tdata +t. Figure 3 (c), only meaningful for A-SLAM, shows the schedule for a 
node that is a neighbor to a node in the route from the source to the destination but is not a guard node. The node, 
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Figure 3: Case I wakeup-sleep timing schedule for (a) a node in the data route; (b) a guard node; (c) a 
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TdataTcm= Tcontrol + Twarmup  
Figure 4: Case II wakeup-sleep timing schedule for (a) a node in the data route; (b) a guard node 
According to SLAM, each node sends a wake-up signal at the earliest possible opportunity (as soon as it is 
awake) to minimize the delay. From Figure 3, it can be seen that per hop, the delay incurred is Tcontrol + Twarmup and 




Case II: (Tcontrol + Twarmup) ≤ Tdata with t = Tdata – (Tcontrol + Twarmup)  
Figure 4 shows the timing schedule for this case. Figure 4 (a) shows the schedule for a node in the route between 
the source and the destination. The node, n1, wakes up at T3 and goes to sleep at T9, where T9-T3 = Tdata (to receive 
data) + Tdata (send the data to the next-hop) + Tdata (as a guard for n2) = 3Tdata. Figure 4 (b) shows the schedule for 
a guard node. The guard, g1, wakes up at T3 and goes to sleep at T7, where T7-T3 = Tdata (to overhear incoming data 
to the node being monitored, n1) + Tdata (to overhear outgoing data from the node being monitored, n1) = 2Tdata. 
The timing schedule for a node that is a neighbor to a node in the route from the source to the destination but is 
not a guard node is the same as its peer in Case I. 
4 Mathematical Analysis of On-Demand SLAM 
4.1 Security Analysis 
Here we prove that On-Demand SLAM does not degrade the security performance of local monitoring  [37]. 
Specifically, we will prove the following premise.  
Premise: Due to the sleep-wake mechanism for guards in SLAM, no loss in detection coverage occurs.  
For this we prove that for any node Hi in the path S→D (i =1, …, n-1),  
i. Either, the guards for Hi+1 on the link Hi→Hi+1 are awake (and monitoring) at the time communication 
takes place on the link, or 
ii. Hi is suspected of malicious action 
We prove this using the first principle of mathematical induction. 
Let the guards of H1 over the link S→H1 form the set G1, Hn-1→D the set Gn, and Hi-1→Hi the set Gi.  
Base case: The source S is honest and therefore it wakes up the guard nodes in G1. 
Inductive hypothesis: All nodes H1, …, Hi (i ≥ 1) are honest and have woken up the appropriate guards, or have 
been suspected of malicious action. 
To prove: Node Hi+1 is either honest and wakes up the guard nodes in Hi+2 or will be suspected of malicious 
action. 
Case 1: One or more of the nodes H1, …, Hi have been suspected of malicious action. 
Case 2: All the nodes H1, …, Hi have woken up the appropriate guards. 
Proof Case 1: In this case, the malicious action(s) could be detected by rules  1- 3 or rule  4 of Section  3.4. If the 
former, then it does not affect a guard being woken up and all guards in sets G2, …, Gi have been woken up. If the 
latter, then one or more of the guard nodes in the sets G2, …, Gi have not been woken up. If the node, say Hk, does 
not wake up the requisite guards, then it will be suspected by rule  4 and its MalC counter value will be 
incremented.  
Proof Case 2: All the nodes in H1, …, Hi have woken up the guards in the sets G2, …, Gi+1.  
Now Gi+1 is monitoring if Hi+1 is sending a wake-up signal to the guards of Hi+2 over the link Hi+1→Hi+2 i.e., Gi+2. 
If Hi+1 is honest and performs this action, rule  4 is not triggered. But if Hi+1does not perform this action, then rule 
 4 is triggered and Hi+1 is suspected of malicious action. 
Therefore, by the principle of mathematical induction, it is proved that either all guards are woken up at the 
time of monitoring a communication or the malicious nodes are suspected. Since the detection of the guards 
according to rules  1- 3 is not changed from baseline local monitoring, this proves that no loss of detection 
coverage happens due to SLAM. 
4.2 Energy and End-to-End Delay Analysis 
Here we calculate the worst case end-to-end delay of communication with local monitoring without sleep-wake 
(Baseline-LM) and with On-Demand SLAM. Moreover, an upper bound in the consumed energy is computed for 
SLAM and for the case with on-demand sleep-wake and no monitoring (Baseline-OD). For SLAM, the energy is 
calculated separately for a node which is forwarding packets (and, by definition, acting as a guard node), a node 
which is acting just as a guard, and a node that is in the vicinity of the path but is neither a forwarder nor a guard.  
In addition to the notations defined in Section  3.4.3, let Atransmit be the current to transmit (at the middle of the 




from sleep to wakeup (warm up), which is 30mA for Mica2 motes  [43]. Finally, let Aactive be the current in the 
computationally active mode = the current in the idle listening mode = the current in receive mode, which is 8mA 
for Mica2 motes  [43]. 
Let us consider a flow between S and D, separated 
by h hops. The intermediate nodes are n1, n2, …, nh-1. 
The bounding box around S and D covers all possible 
nodes, including forwarding nodes and guard nodes 
that may be involved in the communication between S 
and D. The size of the bounding box is 2r(h+1)r = 
2r2(h+1), where r is the transmission range, Figure 5. 
For On-Demand SLAM, consider the two wakeup-sleep 
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Figure 5: A bounding box over the path S D
Case I: (Tcontrol + Twarmup) > Tdata with t = (Tcontrol + Twarmup) – Tdata 
From Figure 3 it can be seen that delay at the first link (S n1) is Tcontrol + Twarmup + Tdata. Over each of the 
succeeding links, the delay is Tcontrol + Twarmup since the delay due to data (Tdata) gets exposed. This is due the 
sleep-wake schedule process that SLAM uses where the wake-up signal is sent at the earliest opportunity. 
Therefore, the end-to-end delay in SLAM, ΩSLAM(h), for the communication from S to D is 
 ( ) ( 1)( ) ( )SLAM contol warmup data control warmup control warmup datah T T T h T T h T T TΩ = + + + − + = ⋅ + +  (5) 
The end-to-end delay in Baseline-LM is  
 ( )Base LM datah h T−Ω = ⋅  (6) 
In this case, the additional end-to-end delay imposed by SLAM depends on the number of hops between S and D 
 ( ) ( ) ( )SLAM Add SLAM Base LM datah h h h Tτ− −Ω = Ω − Ω = ⋅ +  (7) 
Next, we compute the consumed energy for both Baseline-OD and On-Demand SLAM.  
Baseline-OD: here only the forwarding nodes are involved in the sleep-wake protocol. Using Figure 3 (a), a 
forwarding node ni (i = 1, …, h-1) spends Twarmup = T3-T2 warming up with current consumption of Awarmup, Tdata = 
T4-T3 receiving data with current consumption of Aactive, t = T5-T4 idle waiting for the next-hop to be ready with 
current consumption of Aactive, and Tdata = T6-T5 sending data with current consumption of Atransmit. Therefore, the 
energy expended by a forwarding node ni (i = 1, …, h-1) is  
 ,     ( )   f base warmup warmup control warmup active data transmitT A T T A T Aε = ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅  (8) 
S spends Tcontrol + Twarmup = T3-T1 idle waiting for n1 to wake up with Aactive and Tdata = T4-T3 transmitting data 
with Atransmit. Therefore, the energy expended by S is  
 ,  ( )   S base control warmup active data transmitT T A T Aε = + ⋅ + ⋅  (9) 
D spends Twarmup warming up with Awarmup and Tdata receiving data with Aactive. Therefore, the energy expended 
by D is 
 ,     D base warmup warmup data activeT A T Aε = ⋅ + ⋅  (10) 
On-Demand SLAM: here the sleep-wake protocol involves, in addition to S and D, the forwarding nodes, the 
guard nodes, the neighbors of the forwarding nodes that are not guards. We will compute separately for the three 
kinds of nodes (i) forwarding nodes; (ii) guard nodes that do not act as forwarders; (iii) remaining nodes. The 
energy of S and D is the same as that of Baseline-OD.  
(i) Energy expended by a forwarding node ni (i = 1, …, h-1)  εf,SLAM ≤  εf,base + Tw . Aactive. The additional energy is 
consumed because ni has to look to see if ni+1 forwards the packet that it was just handed by ni. The inequality 
comes in because Tw is the worst case time in case ni+1 is malicious. 
(ii) Energy expended by a guard node that is not a forwarding node εg,SLAM ≤ Twarmup . Awarmup + Tdata . Aactive + Tw . 
Aactive. Consider for example the guard g1 of n1 over the link S n1. g1 has to listen to the communication 




(iii) Energy expended by a node in the bounding box around S and D that is neither a forwarding node nor a guard 
node (the “other node”, hence the notation “o” in the subscript). For G-SLAM where the wake-up signal is 
directed to the relevant guard nodes εo,G-SLAM = 0. For A-SLAM where the wake-up signal is broadcast in a one-
hop neighborhood εo,A-SLAM = Twarmup . Awarmup. 
Case II: (Tcontrol + Twarmup) ≤ Tdata with t = Tdata – (Tcontrol + Twarmup)  
The end-to-end delay for SLAM in this case is exactly the same as that of Case I (Equation (5)) after exchanging 
Tdata with (Twarmup + Tcontrol).  
 ( ) ( 1)( ) ( )SLAM contol warmup data data data control warmuph T T T h T h T T TΩ = + + + − = ⋅ + +  (11) 
The end-to-end delay for Baseline-LM is exactly the same as that of Case I, (6). In this case, the additional end-
to-end delay imposed by SLAM is fixed and does not depend on the number of hops between S and D 
 ( ) ( ) ( )SLAM Add SLAM Base LM control warmuph h h T T− −Ω = Ω − Ω = +  (12) 
For the energy, again we consider both Baseline-OD and On-Demand SLAM. 
Baseline-OD: the energy for S and D are exactly the same as that of Case I (Equations (9) and (10)). The energy 
of the forwarding nodes is the same as that of Case I after replacing (Twarmup + Tcontrol) with Tdata. 
 ,     ( + )f base warmup warmup data active transmitT A T A Aε = ⋅ + ⋅  (13) 
On-Demand SLAM: All energy computations are the same as in Case I. 
Now consider that there are η concurrent flows going on in the network. The total energy consumed by all the 
nodes is maximized when there is no spatial and temporal overlap between the multiple flows. In this case the 








≤∑∪ .)  
The area of the bounding box, Figure 5, as a function of the number of hops between S and D, h, is A(h) = 
2r2(h+1). The total number of nodes in the bounding box N(h) = A(h)ρ, where ρ is the density. The number of 
forwarding nodes F(h) = h-1. The number of guard nodes G(h) = 0.55N(h)-F(h)  [37]. The number of other nodes 
O(h) = N(h)-(F(h)+G(h)). Next we compute the total expected energy over all the flows for both Baseline-OD and 
On-Demand SLAM, ignoring the energy of S and D. 
Baseline-OD: The expected energy expended by the entire set of forwarding nodes for a single flow is 
 { },1. ,[ ] [ ( )]f base f baseE E F hε ε= ⋅  (14) 
On-Demand SLAM: The expected energy expended by the entire set of nodes in the bounding box for a single 
flow is  
 { },1, , , ,[ ] [ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )]N SLAM f SLAM g SLAM o SLAME E F h E G h E O hε ε ε ε≤ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  (15) 
These computations depend on the value of E[h]. To compute E[h], consider the source S at the center of a set 
of concentric circles – the first one of radius r (the transmission range), the second of radius 2r, and so on. The 
nodes in the second ring are two hops away from S, those in the third ring are three hops away, and so on. Let the 
number of nodes in ring i be mi. Assuming a Poisson process for distribution of the nodes with rate ρ. mi = πr2ρ 
when i=1 and mi= π[((i+1)r)2-(ir)2] when i>1. In general, through simplification, mi = πr2ρ(2i-1) 
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In Figure 6, we plot the extra delay of  SLAM over 
Baseline-LM for cases I (Equation (7)) and II 
(Equation (12)) above with Tdata = 7ms and t =1ms. 
The figure shows that the additional delay due to SLAM 
increases linearly with the number of hops for Case I 
while it remains constant for Case 2.  
The expected value of the total energy expended (for 
all the η concurrent flows) is upper-bounded by η 
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Figure 6: Extra delay due to SLAM over  
Baseline-LM
5 Simulation Results 
We use the ns-2 simulator  [42] to simulate a data exchange protocol over a network with local monitoring 
enabled according to the protocol in  [37]. We simulate two scenarios individually without A-SLAM (the baseline) 
and with A-SLAM. The baseline is an implementation of a state-of-the-art local monitoring protocol presented in 
 [37]. A-SLAM scenario is built on top of the baseline scenario to provide sleep-wake service for the guards. Nodes 
are distributed randomly over a square area with a fixed average node density, 100 nodes over 204m×204m. Each 
node acts as a source and generates data according to a Poisson process with rate m. The destination is chosen at 
random and is changed using an exponential random distribution with rate λ. A route is evicted if unused for 
TOutRoute time. The experimental parameters are given in Table 1. The results are averages over 30 runs. The 
malicious nodes are chosen at random so that they are more than 2 hops away from each other. 
Table 1: Default simulation parameters 
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Tx Range (r) 30 m Destination change rate (λ) 0.02 per sec Simulation time 1500 sec 
Number of 
neighbors (NB) 
8 Number of malicious 
nodes (M) 
4 Fraction of data 
monitored (fdat) 
0.6 
TOutRoute 50 sec Packet generation rate (m) 0.1 per sec Watch time (Tw) 30ms 
Channel BW 40 kbps Warm up time (Twarmup) 5ms Number of nodes (N) 100 
Adversary model: We are simulating a selective forwarding attack launched by a group of malicious nodes that 
collude and establish wormholes in the network  [38],  [44]- [46]. During the wormhole attack, a malicious node 
captures packets from one location in the network, and “tunnels” them to another malicious node at a distant 
point, which replays them locally. This makes the tunneled packet arrive either sooner or with a lesser number of 
hops compared to the packets transmitted over normal multihop routes. This creates the illusion that the two end 
points of the tunnel are very close to each other. The two malicious end points of the tunnel may use it to pass 
routing traffic to attract routes through them and then launch a variety of attacks against the data traffic flowing 
on the wormhole, such as selectively dropping the data packets. Unless otherwise mentioned, each node 
selectively drops a packet passing through it with uniform probability of 0.6. 
Variable Input metrics: (i) Fraction of data monitored (fdat) – each guard node randomly monitors a given 
fraction of the data packets. At other times, it can be asleep from the point of view of a guard’s responsibility. (ii) 
Data traffic load (μ). (iii) Number of malicious nodes (M) – the number of malicious nodes that collude to 
establish wormholes and afterwards selectively drop the data. 
Output metrics: Delivery ratio – the ratio of the number of packets delivered to the destination to the number of 
packets sent out by a node averaged over all the nodes in the network. Watch buffer size – the runtime count of the 
maximum size of the watch buffer being maintained at a guard, measured in number of entries. The maximum is 
taken over all the guards. % Average monitor wakeup time – the time a node has to wakeup specifically to do 
monitoring averaged over all the nodes as a percentage of the simulation time. Average end-to-end delay – the 
time it takes a data packet to reach the final destination averaged over all successfully received data packets. % 




percentage of the total number of nodes that is isolated due to natural collisions on the wireless channel. Isolation 
latency – the time between when the node performs its first malicious action to the time by which all the 
neighbors of the node have isolated it averaged over all isolated malicious nodes.  
Note that our goal is not to show the variation of the output metrics with the input parameters for local 
monitoring, since that has been amply covered in  [36] [37]. Our goal here is to study the relative effect on local 
monitoring with ASLAM and without.  
5.1 Effect of fraction of data monitored 
The amount of data traffic is typically several orders of magnitude larger than the amount of control traffic. It 
may not be reasonable for a guard node to monitor all the data traffic in its monitored links. Therefore a 
reasonable optimization is to monitor only a fraction of the data traffic. In this set of experiments, our goal is to 

































































Figure 7: Effect of fraction of data monitored on (a) delivery ratio, (b) % true isolation, and (c) end-to-end 
delay for both SLAM and the baseline 
Figure 7 shows the variations of delivery ratio, % true isolation, and end-to-end delay as we vary fdat. Figure 7 
(a) shows that the % delivery ratio is almost stable above 90% irrespective of the value of fdat. This desirable 
effect is achieved by proper selection of the MalC increment for each value of fdat. The MalC increment is 
designed with an inverse relation to the fdat. Figure 7 (b) shows that the % of true isolation is almost stable as we 
vary fdat due to the same reasoning as for Figure 7 (a). Importantly, the delivery ratio and the % true isolation in 
A-SLAM are close to the baseline for all values of fdat. However, the results in A-SLAM are slightly worse than 
those of the baseline. This is because some of the data packets are additionally dropped in A-SLAM by forwarding, 
destination, or guard nodes that happen to be asleep when the data packet arrives. This unwanted sleep may occur 
due to collision in the sleep-wake control channel which prevents the respective nodes from waking up. Although 
the control channel is a separate channel contention still occurs, where a guard of two consecutive links are sent 
separate wake-up signals concurrently. Figure 7 (c) shows that the end-to-end delay is slightly higher for A-SLAM 
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Figure 8: Effect of fdat on (a) % false isolation; (b) isolation latency; (c) watch buffer size for local 
monitoring with and without SLAM 
   Figure 8 shows the variations of % false isolation (Figure 8 (a)), isolation latency (Figure 8 (b)), and watch 
buffer size (Figure 8 (a)) as we vary fdat. Figure 8 (a) clearly shows that the maximum watch buffer size in ASLAM 
is close to the base line. Figure 8 (a) shows that the % false isolation is slightly lower for ASLAM than the baseline 
since some of the packets that may falsely identify a node as malicious may get lost in ASLAM due to unwanted 
sleep, which lowers the % false isolation. Figure 8 (b) shows that the isolation latency in ASLAM is higher than 
that of the baseline due to data packets that may be missed while a node is in unwanted sleep. This causes the 
malicious counters at the guards to reach the threshold value of detection slower, and consequently increases the 
time of detection and isolation. Figure 8 (c) shows that as the fraction of data monitored increases, the watch 




overhead by monitoring only a small fraction of packets while maintaining almost the same detection coverage 
(Figure 7). However, note that even though the watch buffer sizes in A-SLAM and the baseline are close, that in 
A-SLAM is slightly higher. This is due to the extra delay in packet forwarding in A-SLAM due to warm up of the 
nodes before sending the data. This delay causes the monitored packets to stay longer in the watch buffer thereby 
increasing its size. 
5.2 Effect of number of malicious nodes 
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Figure 9: Effect of number of malicious nodes on (a) % delivery ratio, (b) % true isolation, and (c) % false 
isolation for local monitoring with and without ASLAM  
Figure 9 shows the variations of % delivery ratio, % true isolation, and % false isolation as we vary the number 
of malicious nodes (M). Figure 9 (a) shows that the % delivery ratio slightly decreases as M increases. This is due 
to the packets dropped before the malicious nodes are detected and isolated. As the number of malicious nodes 
increases, this initial drop increases and thus the delivery ratio decreases. Figure 9 (b) shows that the % true 
isolation also slightly decreases as we increase M. This is because the number of available guards in the network 
decreases as more and more nodes get compromised. These two metrics in A-SLAM are slightly lower than those 
of the base line due to the unwanted sleep described in the explanation of Figure 7. Figure 9 (c) shows that the % 
false isolation increases as we increase M. This is because not all guard nodes come to the decision to isolate a 
malicious node at the same time. Therefore, a given guard node may suspect another guard node when the latter 
isolates a malicious node but the former still has not. The occurrence of this situation increases with M and hence 
the % of false isolation increases with M. For example, a guard node G1 detects a malicious node M earlier than 
the other guard nodes for the link to M. G1 subsequently drops all the traffic forwarded to M and is therefore 
suspected by other guard nodes for M. This problem can be solved by having an authenticated one-hop broadcast 
whenever a guard node performs a local detection. The % false isolation in A-SLAM is lower than that of the 
baseline. Again, this is because some of the packets that may falsely identify a node as malicious may get lost in 
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Figure 10: Effect of number of malicious nodes on (a) watch buffer size, (b) isolation latency, and (c) end-
to-end delay with and without ASLAM 
   Again, Figure 10 confirms that ASLAM has a very close behavior on the output metrics as the baseline. The 
slight change is due to the same effects that we show in the explanation of Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
5.3 Effect of data traffic load (μ) 
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Figure 11: Effect of data traffic load on (a) % false isolation, (b) isolation latency, and (c) end-to-end delay 
for local monitoring with and without SLAM 
Figure 11 shows the variations of % false isolation, isolation latency, and end-to-end delay as we vary the data 
traffic load (1/μ). Figure 11 (a) shows that the % false isolation increases as the traffic load increases (1/μ 
increases). As the traffic load increases, the probability of collision increases. This in turn increases the possibility 
of false accusation since a guard, say G, may falsely accuse a node, say A, of not forwarding a packet if either G 
has a collision when A forwards or A has a collision while receiving the packet. The explanation of the relative 
performance with and without A-SLAM is the same as for Figure 9 (c). Figure 11 (b) shows that the isolation 
latency increases as the traffic load increases. As the traffic load increases, the MalC increment decreases. This 
causes the MalC threshold to be reached slower at a guard node, which results in increasing the isolation latency 
of the malicious nodes. Also the higher traffic load lays it open to the possibility of some packets being missed 
due to natural collisions and thereby preventing the increment to the malicious counter and therefore, reaching the 
threshold faster. Note that the isolation latency in A-SLAM is higher than that of the baseline because of the 
additional packets missed due to the unwanted sleep. Figure 11 (c) shows that end-to-end delay increase as the 
traffic load increases due the higher contention for the channel. The relative explanation of end-to-end delay with 
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Figure 12: Effect of data traffic load on (a) % delivery ratio, (b) % true isolation, and (c) watch buffer size 
with and without SLAM 
Again, Figure 12confirms that ASLAM has a very close behavior on the output metrics as the baseline. The 
slight change is due to the same effects that we show in the explanation of Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
5.4 Wakeup time variations 
In this section, we study the effect of varying the fraction of data monitored (fdat), the number of malicious 
nodes (M), and the data traffic load (μ) on the percentage of time that a node needs to stay awake using A-SLAM 
to fulfill the quality of service measures imposed by the underlying local monitoring scheme. 
Figure 13 (a) shows that the percentage of wakeup time required for monitoring increases as the fraction of 
monitored data increases due to the increase in the number of data packets that a node needs to overhear in its 
neighborhood. Figure 13 (b) shows that the percentage of wakeup time decreases as we increase the number of 
malicious nodes. As the number of malicious nodes increases, the number of data packets in the system decreases 
since the malicious nodes are isolated and disallowed from generating data packets. Therefore, the number of 
packets that need to be monitored decreases, which results in a decrease in the average percentage of wakeup 
monitor time. Figure 13 (c) shows that the average percentage of monitoring wakeup time increases as the data 
traffic load increases due the increase of data packets that need to be monitored. 
Overall, compared to the no sleeping case, A-SLAM saves 30%-129% listening energy for different amounts of 
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Figure 13: Variations on the percentage of monitoring wakeup time as we vary (a) the fraction of data 
monitored (fdat); (b) number of malicious nodes (M); and (c) data traffic load (μ) 
5.5 Effect of distance on delay 
We evaluate the variations of the end-to-end delay with the number of hops between the source and destination 
pairs. Figure 14 (a) shows that the end-to-end delay in A-SLAM is always higher than that of the baseline due to 
the warm-up time needed to wake up the nodes before sending the data. However, due the scheduling strategy in 
A-SLAM in which each node sends a wake-up signal at the earliest possible opportunity (Section  3.4.3),  the 
warm-up time is only in the critical path at the first hop and therefore, the delay is not cumulative with the number 
of hops. Figure 14 (b) shows that the difference in the end-to-end delay has a horizontal trend – it fluctuates 
between 6.5 and 10 ms due to the randomness in the traffic pattern and the location of the source-destination pair. 
The standard deviation in the difference is only 9.1%, expressed as a percentage of the baseline delay. This 
horizontal trend of the additional delay due to SLAM follows the trend obtained analytically in Section  4.2 for the 
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Figure 14: (a) Variation of the end-to-end delay with the hop count for local monitoring with and without 
A-SLAM; (b) the difference in the end-to-end delay with and without A-SLAM 
6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented a protocol called SLAM to make local monitoring in sensor networks energy-
aware while maintaining the detection coverage. We classify the domain of sleep-wake protocols into three 
classes and SLAM correspondingly has three manifestations depending on which baseline sleeping protocol (BSP) 
is used in the network. For the first class (synchronized sleep-wake), local monitoring needs no modification. For 
the second class (connectivity-coverage preserving sleep-wake), local monitoring can call the BSP with changed 
parameter values. For the third class (on-demand sleep-wake), adapting local monitoring is the most challenging 
and requires hardware support as low-power or passive wake-up antennas. We propose a scheme whereby before 
communicating on a link, a node awakens the guard nodes responsible for local monitoring on its next hop. We 
design the scheme to work with adversarial node behavior. We prove analytically that On-Demand SLAM does not 
weaken the security property of local monitoring. Simulation experiments bring out that over a wide range of 
conditions, the performance of local monitoring with SLAM is comparable to that without SLAM, while listening 
energy savings of 30-129 times is realized, depending on the network load. Our ongoing work is looking at 





[1] W. Zhang and G. Cao, “DCTC: Dynamic Convoy Tree-Based Collaboration for Target Tracking in Sensor 
Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communication, vol. 3 (5), 2004, pp. 1689-1701. 
[2] S. Pattem, S. Poduri, and B. Krishnamachari, “Energy-quality tradeoffs for target tracking in wireless 
sensor networks,” in second workshop on Information Processing for Sensor Networks (IPSN), 2003. 
[3] C. Gui and P. Mohapatra, “Power conservation and quality of surveillance in target tracking sensor 
networks,” in Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and 
networking (MOBICOM), 2004, pp. 129-143.  
[4] B. Chen, K. Jamieson, H. Balakrishnan, and R. Morris, “Span: An energy-efficient coordination algorithm 
for topology maintenance in ad hoc wireless networks,” in MobiCom’01.  
[5] Y. Xu, J. Heidemann, and D. Estrin, “Geography-informed energy conservation for ad hoc routing,” in 
MobiCom, 2001, pp. 70-84.  
[6] K. Chakrabarty, S. S. Iyengar, H. Qi, and E. Cho, “Grid coverage for surveillance and target location in 
distributed sensor networks,” in IEEE Transactions on Computers, 51(12), pp.1448-1453, 2002.  
[7] D. Tian and N. D. Georganas, “A coverage-preserved node scheduling scheme for large wireless sensor 
networks,” in Proceedings of First International Workshop on Wireless Sensor Networks and Applications 
(WSNA), pp. 32-41, 2002.  
[8] T. Yan, T. He, and J. A. Stankovic, “Differentiated surveillance for sensor networks,” in The First ACM 
Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems(Sensys), pp. 51-62, 2003.  
[9] F. Ye, G. Zhong, S. Lu, and L. Zhang, “Peas: A robust energy conserving protocol for long-lived sensor 
networks,” in the 23rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), pp. 169-177, 
2003.  
[10] S. Bhattacharya, G. Xing, C. Lu, G.-C. Roman,  O. Chipara, and B. Harris, “Dynamic wake-up and 
topology maintenance protocols with spatiotemporal guarantees,” in Information Processing in Sensor 
Networks (IPSN), pp. 28-34, 2005. 
[11] G. Xing, C. Lu, R. Pless, and J. A. O’Sullivan, “Co-Grid: an efficient coverage maintenance protocol for 
distributed sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the third international symposium on Information 
processing in sensor networks (IPSN), pp. 414 - 423 , 2004.  
[12] S. Kumar, T. H. Lai, and J. Balogh, “On k-coverage in a mostly sleeping sensor network” in International 
Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MOBICOM), pp. 144-158, 2004. 
[13] J. V. Greunen, D. Petrovic, A. Bonivento, J. Rabaey, K. Ramchandran, and A.S.  Vincentelli, “Adaptive 
sleep discipline for energy conservation and robustness in dense sensor networks,” in IEEE International 
Conference on Communications, Vol. 6,  pp. 3657 – 3662, 2004.   
[14] F. Koushanfar, A. Davare, D. Nguyen, M. Potkonjak, A. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli. “Low power 
coordination in wireless ad-hoc networks” in International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and 
Design (ISLPED), pp. 475 – 480, 2003.  
[15] W. R. Heinzelman, A. Chandrakasan, and H. Balakrishnan, “Energy-Efficient Communication Protocol for 
Wireless Microsensor Networks,” in the Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences, 2004, pp. 3005-3014.  
[16] G. Xing, X. Wang, Y. Zhang, C. Lu, R. Pless, and C. Gill, “Integrated coverage and connectivity 
configuration for energy conservation in sensor networks,” in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks 
(TOSN), Vol. 1 ,  Issue 1, pp.  36-72, 2005.  
[17] E. Riedy and R. Szewczyk. “Power and control in networked sensors,” 
http://webs.cs.berkeley.edu/tos/papers/cs294-8.pdf, May 2000. 
[18] J. W. Hui, Z. Ren, , and B. Krogh, “Sentry-based power management in wireless sensor Networks,” in the 
2nd International Workshop on Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN), pp. 458-472, 2003.  
[19] W. Ye, J. Heidemann, and D. Estrin, "An energy efficient MAC protocol for wireless sensor Networks," in 




[20] R. Naik, S. Biswas, and S. Datta, “Distributed Sleep-Scheduling Protocols for Energy Conservation in 
Wireless Networks,” in Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences (HICSS), pp. 285b - 285b, 2005.  
[21] S. Liu, K. Fan, and P. Sinha, “Dynamic Sleep Scheduling using Online Experimentation for Wireless 
Sensor Networks,” in the Proceedings of the Third International. Workshop on Measurement, Modeling and 
Performance Analysis of Wireless Sensor Networks (SenMetrics), 2005.  
[22] A. Mainwaring, J. Polastre, R. Szewczyk, D. Culler, and J. Anderson, “Wireless sensor networks for habitat 
monitoring,” in ACM International Workshop on Wireless Sensor Networks and Applications, pp. 88-97, 
2002.  
[23] C. Guo, L. C. Zhong, and J. M. Rabaey, “Low power distributed MAC for ad hoc sensor radio networks,” 
in IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM '01), pp. 2944–2948, vol.5, 2001. 
[24] J. Rabaey, J. Ammer, T. Karalar, S. Li, B. Otis, M. Sheets, and T. Tuan, “Picoradios for wireless sensor 
networks: The next challenge in ultra-low-power design,” in the Proceedings of the International Solid-
State Circuits Conference, pp. 200-201, 2002.  
[25] J. Silva., J. Shamberger, M. J. Ammer, C. Guo, S. Li, R. Shah, T. Tuan, M. Sheets, J. M. Rabaey, B. 
Nikolic, A. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, and P. Wright, “Design methodology for picoradio networks,” in the 
Proceedings of the Design Automation and Test in Europe, pp. 314-323, 2001. 
[26] http://www.austriamicrosystems.com/03products/data/AS3931Product_brief_0204.pdf. 
[27] L. Gu and J.A Stankovic, “Radio-Triggered Wake-Up Capability for Sensor Networks,” in Real-Time and 
Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS), pp. 27-36, 2004. 
[28] Chipcon CC1000 Datasheet, Chipcon Inc. http://www.chipcon.com/files/CC1000DataSheet21.pdf. 
[29] Y. Huang and W. Lee, “A cooperative intrusion detection system for ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of 
the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks, pp. 135-147, 2003. 
[30] A. Silva, M. Martins, B. Rocha, A. Loureiro, L. Ruiz, and H. Wong, “Decentralized intrusion detection in 
wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Quality of service & 
security in wireless and mobile networks, pp. 16-23, 2005. 
[31] S. Marti, T. J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, “Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks,” 
MobiCom’00, pp. 255-265, 2000. 
[32] S.J. Lee and M. Gerla, “Split Multipath Routing with Maximally Disjoint Paths in Ad Hoc Networks,” in 
IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), pp. 3201-3205, 2001.  
[33] A. A. Pirzada and C. McDonald, “Establishing Trust In Pure Ad-hoc Networks,” Proceedings of 27th 
Australasian Computer Science Conference (ACSC'04), pp. 47-54, 2004.  
[34] S. Buchegger, J.-Y. Le Boudec, “Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol: Cooperation Of 
Nodes - Fairness In Distributed Ad-hoc NeTworks,” in MobiHoc’02, pp. 80-91, 2002.  
[35] I. Khalil, S. Bagchi, and  N. B. Shroff, “Analysis and Evaluation of SECOS, a protocol for Energy Efficient 
and Secure Communication in Sensor Networks”, accepted for publication in Ad Hoc Networks Journal 
(ADHOC), number of pages: 32, notification date: Dec. 2005.  
[36] I. Khalil, S. Bagchi, and C. Nina-Rotaru, “Dicas: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in 
Sensor Networks,” IEEE/CreateNet SecureComm, pp. 89-100, 2005.  
[37] I. Khalil, S. Bagchi, and N. Shroff, “LiteWorp: A Lightweight Countermeasure for the Wormhole Attack in 
Multihop Wireless Networks,” International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 
’05), pp. 612-621, 2005. 
[38] C. Karlof and D. Wagner, “Secure Routing in Sensor Networks: Attacks and Countermeasures,” in the 1st 
IEEE International Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications, pp. 113-127, 2003. 
[39] S. Zhu, S. Xu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “Establishing Pair-wise Keys For Secure Communication in Ad Hoc 
Networks: A Probabilistic Approach,” in the 11th IEEE International Conference on Network protocols 




[40] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. Han, and P. Varshney, “ A Pairwise Key Pre-distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor 
Networks,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communication security (CCS),  
pp. 42-51, 2003. 
[41] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Establishing Pair-wise Keys in Distributed Sensor Networks,” in Proceedings of the 
10th ACM conference on Computer and communication security (CCS), pp. 52-61, 2003. 
[42] “The Network Simulator ns-2,” At: www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/ 
[43] http://www.xbow.com/products/Product_pdf_files/Wireless_pdf/MICA2_Datasheet.pdf. 
[44] Y. C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D.B. Johnson, “Packet leashes: a defense against wormhole attacks in wireless 
networks,” in Proceedings of the 22nd INFOCOM, pp. 1976-1986, 2003. 
[45] L. Hu and D. Evans, “Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole attacks,” in Network and 
Distributed System Security Symposium, 2004. 
[46] L. Lazos,  R. Poovendran,  C. Meadows, P.  Syverson, and L. W. Chang, “Preventing wormhole attacks on 
wireless ad hoc networks: a graph theoretic approach,” IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking 
Conference (WCNC), Vol. 2, pp. 1193 – 1199, 2005. 
 
